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NORTH DAKOTA JUMPS ON THE AGRICULTURAL
DISPARAGEMENT LAW BANDWAGON BY ENACTING
LEGISLATION TO MEET A CONCERN ALREADY ACTIONABLE
UNDER STATE DEFAMATION LAW AND FAILING
TO HEED CONSTITUTIONALITY CONCERNS
I. INTRODUCTION
The newest trend in defamation law is aimed at protecting the
agricultural economies of individual states. For that reason, it comes as
little surprise that North Dakota, an agricultural powerhouse, ' has enact-
ed an anti-disparagement law aimed at protecting not only the state's
agricultural products, but its agricultural practices as well. 2 Termed
everything from "veggie libel laws" 3 to "sirloin slander bills," 4 these
new statutes have cropped up in thirteen states over the past seven years. 5
Generally, these laws allow agricultural producers to bring a claim for
damages against individuals who make false assertions about a
producer's products.
From the perspective of the agricultural industry, the purpose of
these laws is to provide producers with some recourse when they are
1. North Dakota agricultural production generates $1.3 billion in annual state economic revenue.
Jerry Doan, Agricultural Defamation No Laughing Matter, BISMARCK TRIB., Feb. 23, 1997, at 4D.
2. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-44-01 to -04 (1997).
3. See Megan W. Semple, Veggie Libel Meets Free Speech: A Constitutional Analysis of Agricul-
ture Disparagement Laws, 15 VA. ENVT. L.J. 403, 412 (1995-1996) (stating that this is a collective
name for the various state disparagement laws).
4. See Doan, supra note 1, at 4D (arguing that this as an inappropriate term for North Dakota's
legislation).
5. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-620 to -622 (1996) (allowing any person who produces, markets, or
sells a perishable food product to bring a claim for disparagement); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113
(West Supp. 1995) (permitting anyone who transports, ships, sells, or markets a perishable food
product to bring a disparagement action); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-16-115(l)(c) (West Supp. 1996)
(providing that it is an unlawful act to intentionally make false statements about the condition or quality
of farm products); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 865.065 (West Supp. 1996) (encompassing actions for the
disparagement of any agricultural or aquacultural food product or commodity produced within the
state); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-16-1 to -4 (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1996) (providing a cause of action to
any individual in the "entire chain from grower to consumer"); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-2001 to -2003 (Supp.
1996) (providing a cause of action to producers of perishable agricultural food products); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 4501 to 4504 (West Supp. 1996) (allowing a claim to any producer of perishable
agricultural or aquacultural food products); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 69-1-251 to -257 (Supp. 1994)
(providing a cause of action to any producer of perishable agricultural or aquacultural food products);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-44-01 to -04 (Supp. 1997) (providing a claim to both producers and
agricultural organizations for the disparagement of both agricultural products and practices); Oiuo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81 (Anderson Supp. 1996) (providing a claim to any producer or seller of an
agricultural or aquacultural product); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 3010 to 3012 (West Supp. 1996)
(limiting recovery to the disparagement of perishable agricultural food products); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
33 20-IOA-1 to -4 (Michie 1995) (providing an action for the disparagement of both agricultural
products and practices); TEX. Civ. PPAc. & REm. CODE ANN. § 96.001 (West Supp. 1996) (allowing a
claim against anyone who disparages perishable food products).
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injured financially by false statements. 6 However, inquiry reveals that
several of these statutes may be challenged on the basis that they violate
the First Amendment's principles of free speech 7 and provide producers
with an avenue to circumvent the stringent common law requirements of
product disparagement. Consequently, the debate involves the extent to
which the First Amendment will protect speech that is particularly
harmful to a state's economic well-being. 8
This Note will discuss the constitutionality of North Dakota's recent-
ly enacted agricultural disparagement statute and attempt to provide
alternative solutions that will not violate fundamental notions of free
speech for states desiring to protect their agrarian economies. Further-
more, this Note will illustrate how North Dakota's legislature might have
prematurely passed the legislation to meet a particular concern that
could have been addressed through existing common law defamation or
disparagement.
Part II of this Note will compare the common law torts of defama-
tion and product disparagement and provide an overview of the constitu-
tional history surrounding defamation claims. Part III will detail the
incidents in Washington state which prompted that state's apple growers
to bring suit to recover their financial losses. Particular focus will be
given to Auvil v. CBS,9 a common law disparagement decision denying
the apple growers recovery and inciting the passage of several state
agricultural disparagement statutes. Part IV will provide an overview of
some of the general features of state agricultural disparagement statutes.
Part V will discuss the contents of North Dakota's agricultural law and
the unique legislative history behind its enactment. Finally, Part VI will
analyze the constitutionality of North Dakota's statute and describe
alternatives to the present statute.
6. See, e.g., Hearing on HB 1176 Before the Senate Agriculture Comm., 55th Leg. Sess. (N.D.
1997) [hereinafter Hearing] (statements of Senator Terry Wanzek, Chairman of Senate Agriculture
Committee).
7. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peacea-
bly to nssemb!e and. pt;tion the . . ...... ... fOr a fediess of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. See David J. Bederman, Of Banana Bills and Veggie Hate Crimes: The Constitutionality of
Agricultural Disparagement Statutes, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135, 145 (1997) (stating that the main
purpose of the various agricultural disparagement statutes is to protect state agricultural and
aquacultural economies).
9. 800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992), aff'd, 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1567 (1996).
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II. DEFAMATION AND DISPARAGEMENT: TWO DISTINCT
COMMON LAW TORTS
Before addressing the constitutionality of North Dakota's agricul-
tural disparagement statute, it is helpful to look at the approach tradition-
ally taken in defamation and disparagement actions. This will aid in
understanding the changes the United States Supreme Court has made to
defamation over the previous thirty years. While both defamation and
disparagement address injury stemming from the communication of
false statements, each originated to protect a very separate interest.10
Defamation actions were developed to provide recovery for damage to
an individual's reputation,'1 while disparagement claims were intended
to protect product and property interests. 12 Consequently, the original
elements of each tort were very different.1 3
A. DEFAMATION AND ITS COMMON LAW ELEMENTS
Defamation involves the "unprivileged publication of false and
defamatory statements concerning a plaintiff" 14 and encompasses the
"twin torts" of libel and slander. 15 The traditional requirements of a
defamation action differed from the tort's elements today. Before 1965,
defamation was a strict liability tort in the sense that the plaintiff was
relieved from proving any fault on the part of the defendant making the
defamatory statement. 16 In other words, prior to 1965, an individual
making a statement was not relieved of liability even if that individual
had a reasonable basis for believing the statement was true. 17 Addition-
ally, in a pre-1965 defamation action, the falsity of the defendant's
statement was presumed. 18 As a result, a defendant could only avoid
10. Arlen W. Langvardt, Free Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommodating Defamation,
Commercial Speech, and Unfair Competition Considerations in the Law of Injurious Falsehood, 62
TEMP. L. REV. 903, 907-19 (1992)
11. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OFTORTS § 111, at 771 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. g (1976) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
13. See Rawn Howard Reinhard, The Tort of Disparagement and the Developing First Amend-
ment, 1987 DUKE L.J. 727, 730-32 (1987) (providing a historical analysis of both defamation and
disparagement); see also Langvardt, supra note 10, at 907-19 (discussing the history of defamation and
injurious falsehood claims).
14. Langvardt, supra note 10, at 907 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 558).
15. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 11, at 771. Slander involves a written publication,
while libel is the oral publication of a defamatory statement. Id.
16. Langvardt, supra note 10, at 909 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 909-10.
18. Id.
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liability for the defamatory statement by showing its truthfulness. 19
Finally, damages were also presumed under the traditional approach. 20
That is, a plaintiff was not required to prove actual injury to reputation
from the defendant's defamatory statement. 21 While the presumption of
damages has been called an "oddity of tort law," 22 this presumption
developed because harm to reputation was normally expected to result
from a defamatory statement.23 These presumptions remained in effect
until the 1960s when the Supreme Court began applying First Amend-
ment theories to the tort.24
Defamation's first common law element was a requirement that the
defendant's statement concern or be about the plaintiff, often referred to
as the "of and concerning" requirement. 25 While the defamatory state-
ment did not need to specifically mention the plaintiff by name, it was
necessary that a reasonable person could conclude that the statement
described the plaintiff.26
The second element required that the defendant's statement be of a
defamatory nature. 27 A statement was considered defamatory if it
affected an individual's reputation, specifically lowering the individual
in the esteem of the community or deterring others from associating with
19. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 116, at 839 (stating that the well settled common law
rule before the Supreme Court altering defamation's constitutional requirements was that truth was an
affirmative defense).
20. Lisa Magee Arent, A Matter of " 'Governing' Importance: Providing Business Defamation
and Product Disparagement Defendants Full First Amendment Protection ," IND. L.J. 441, 447 (1992).
Defamation cases in which the plaintiff was allowed to presume damages included libel claims and
four specific instances of slander including: statements imputing criminal activity, repugnant diseases,
unchastity, and statements affecting an individual's business or trade. Id. at 447 n.33 (citation
omitted).
21. See Langvardt, supra note 10, at 911 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, §§ 622 cmt. a, 623
cmt. a (noting, however, that a plaintiff could show proof of actual injury and emotional distress to
increase the amount recovered)).
22. See Langvardt, supra note 10, at 911 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349
(1974)).
23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 621 cmt. a.
24. See generally 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW ON TORTS, § 5.0, at 4-5 [hereinafter
HARPER].
25. See Langvardt, supra note 10, at 908 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 559). The "of
and concerning" reqvienet wa -identificd as a corstiuiiunai requirement in 1966. See Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1966). The facts of this case involved a columnist who published an article
about a ski recreation area. Id. at 78. The supervisor for the group of county commissioners in
charge of the ski area filed a suit for libel claiming that the columnist had made false statements about
him. Id. The Court held that the plaintiff supervisor was required to show that the defendant's state-
ment specifically referenced him. Id. at 81 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 290-92
(1963)). Because the plaintiff commissioner failed to show that the article specifically referenced
him, the libel claim was constitutionally lacking. See generally Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 82-87.
26. See Semple, supra note 3, at 417 (stating that the defamatory statement must be understood as
referring to the plaintiff) (citations omitted).
27. See Langvardt, supra note 10, at 908.
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the individual. 28 However, it was not necessary that a third party believe
that the defendant's statement was true. 29
The third element of defamation at common law was the publication
requirement. 30 Publication involved the communication of the defama-
tory statement by the defendant to one person other than the defamed. 31
Without the requirement of a third party hearing the defamatory state-
ment, there would be no diminishment of the plaintiffs reputation. 32
B. DISPARAGEMENT AND ITS COMMON LAW ELEMENTS
Disparagement 33 provides economic recovery for defamatory state-
ments made about the quality of a person's products or property. 34 His-
torically, economic injury has been valued less than injury to reputation,
and this is reflected in disparagement's more demanding common law
elements. 35 However, defamation and disparagement shared two of the
same common law elements. Specifically, both torts required the defama-
tory statement be published 36 and "of and concerning" the plaintiff.37
Disparagement differed from defamation with respect to the follow-
ing elements: fault, falsity, and recovery of damages. 38 First, a plaintiff
in a disparagement action is required to prove the defendant's intent to
28. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 559). See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11,
§ 111, at 773 (classifying a statement as defamatory if it subjects the plaintiff to hatred, contempt or
ridicule, or causes the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided).
29. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note I1, § 111, at 780-83 (noting that a third party need only
understand that the statement is meant in a defamatory sense).
30. See Langvardt, supra note 10, at 910 (citations omitted).
31. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 577(1).
32. See HARPER, supra note 24, § 5.15, at 119-20 (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT, supra
note 12, § 577 cmt. b (stating that there is no loss to reputation until a third party hears the defamatory
statement).
33. Disparagement encompasses two actions: slander of title and trade libel. See Reinhard,
supra note 13, at 728-29. Slander of title developed in the 16th century and refer red to a false state-
ment concerning the ownership of property, while trade libel involved a disparaging statement about
the quality of an individual's goods and surfaced as a tort 300 years later. Id. at 729. However, today
commentators often refer to an injury to property interests from a false statement as injurious false-
hood. See Eric M. Stahl, Can Generic Products be Disparaged? The "Of and Concerning" Require-
ment After Alar and the New Crop of Agricultural Disparagement Statutes, 71 WASH. L. R EV. 517, 519
n.10 (1996). A falsehood concerning the quality of an individual's products is often referred to as
slander of goods, trade libel, or product disparagement. Id. However, when the false statement
concerns ownership, not a good, the tort is termed slander of title. Id.
34. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1i, § 128, at 962.
35. Arent, supra note 20, at 446-47. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 623A cmt. g (stating
that "[f]rom the beginning, more stringent requirements were imposed upon the plaintiff seeking to
recover for injurious falsehood in three important respects-falsity of the statement, fault of the
defendant, and proof of damage").
36. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (regarding the publication requirement).
37. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (addressing the "of and concerning" require-
ment).
38. Semple, supra note 3, at 420; see also Langvardt, supra note 10, at 916-19 (describing where
common law disparagement departed from defamation).
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injure or fault. 39 In contrast, defamation was originally a strict liability
tort and thus, the defendant's fault was presumed. 40 However, this
presumption has never been available to an individual bringing a
disparagement action and the plaintiff in a disparagement case has
always been required to show evidence of the defendant's wrongful
intent to injure or fault.4 1
Defamation and disparagement also differed with respect to proof
of falsity requirements. A plaintiff bringing a claim for disparagement
was required to show that the defendant's statement was false. 42 Unlike
defamation, a disparagement plaintiff has never been entitled to a
presumption that the statement was false.43 As mentioned previously, in
a defamation action the defendant's statement was originally presumed
false and this presumption could only be overcome if the defendant
proved that the statement was true.44
Finally, recovery of damages also differed. In an action for dispar-
agement, a plaintiff is required to fulfill a special damage requirement. 45
Under this requirement, the plaintiff must show actual pecuniary loss
stemming from the defendant's false statement in order to recover either
nominal or punitive damages. 4 6 In comparison, damages under a
common law defamation action were presumed. 47
39. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12 § 623 A cmt. d.
40. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing this presumption). The presump-
tion of fault was eliminated by the Supreme Court and now the Court requires different levels of fault
focusing on the classification of the plaintiff party as either a public or private individual. Semple,
supra note 3, at 42 1; see also infra notes 51-54 (explaining the Supreme Court's elimination of the fault
presumption).
41. Reinhard, supra note 13, at 730 (stating that "a showing of an intent to injure has always been
required in disparagement action"); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note II, § 128 at 969-70.
However, the courts are not uniform in their fault requirements. See Semple, supra note 3, at 419
(recognizing the two different liability approaches). Some courts follow the Restatement approach
which requires that the plaintiff show the defendant recognized, or should have recognized, that the
publication would harm the plaintiff. Id. (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, §
623A. The second approach merely requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with
common law malice, meaning the defendant acted with hate, spite, or ill will. See Semple, supra note
3, at 419-20 (citing Systems Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1140-41
(3rd Cir. 1977) (applying a common law malice standard in a slander of title case)).
42. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (addressing the presumption of falsity under
common law defamation).
43. See Langvardt, supra note 10, at 916 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, §§ 623A cmt. g,
651).
44. Langvardt, supra note 10, at 909 (citing PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 116, at 839).
Defamation's presumption of falsity has been removed by the Supreme Court in most defamation
actions. Id.; see also infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing further the Hepps case
which removed this presumption).
45. Langvardt, supra note 10, at 918 (citing PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1I, § 128, at 970-971;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, §§ 623A, 633, 651).
46. Langvardt, supra note 10, at 918.
47. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (discussing defamation damages under
common law).
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In summary, a plaintiff bringing a defamation action prior to 1965
was only required to show that the statement was published and "of and
concerning" the plaintiff because the defendant's fault, the falsity of the
defamatory statement, and damages were all presumed under the com-
mon law approach. However, an individual bringing a claim for dispar-
agement had to meet more onerous requirements. First, the disparage-
ment plaintiff had to prove that the statement was both published and
"of and concerning" the plaintiff. In addition, the defendant's fault, the
falsity of defamatory statement, and actual pecuniary loss stemming
from the statement had to be proven by the plaintiff. Therefore, the two
torts were quite distinguishable under common law.
C. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION AND EVOLUTION OF DEFAMATION LAW
The distinction between common law defamation and product
disparagement significantly narrowed with the constitutionalization 48 of
defamation law beginning with the United States Supreme Court's 1964
landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan .49 A series of cases
followed New York Times in which the Court further interpreted and
clarified defamation law. 50 These cases heightened the requirements for
defamation, and thus, recovery under defamation and disparagement
became quite similar.
1. Fault Requirement Implemented
In New York Times,51 the Supreme Court concluded that fault would
no longer be presumed in defamation actions involving a public official
plaintiff and a statement about that individual's official conduct. 52
Rather, the public official would be required to prove that the defen-
dant's statement was made with actual malice or with "knowledge that it
48. Arent, supra note 20, at 450-51. Constitutionalization of defamation law means that the
Supreme Court recognized a need to modify the common law elements of defamation to recognize the
First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press clauses. See Langvardt, supra note 10, at
923; see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 766 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring) (stating "New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was the first major step in what proved to be a
seemingly irreversible process of constitutionalizing the entire law of libel and slander").
49. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
50. See generally, Arent, supra note 20, at 450-54 (describing the progeny of cases following
New York Times); see also Langvardt, supra note 10, at 923-34 (providing an analysis of several
United States Supreme Court cases altering the common law requirements of defamation).
51. This case involved a defamation action brought by Sullivan, who supervised the Montgomery
city police, against a newspaper for publishing alleged falsehoods in an advertisement. New York
Times, 376 U.S. at 256. The advertisement suggested that civil rights demonstrators had been harassed
by the Montgomery police. Id. at 258-59. The lower courts concluded that the newspaper's state-
ments did concern Sullivan and that the newspaper had acted maliciously in publishing the article. Id.
at 262-64.
52. Id. at 279-80.
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was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."5 3
The Court reasoned that this heightened standard of proof would prevent
a chilling effect on the criticism of public officials. 54
This fault requirement was expanded further in the Court's plurality
opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 55 Rosenbloom involved a
radio report concerning the arrest of Mr. Rosenbloom on charges of
possession of obscene material. 56 The Supreme Court concluded that
the New York Times actual malice standard for public figure plaintiffs
should also extend to cases involving matters of public interest.5 7
Therefore, private and public figure plaintiffs were required to prove that
the defendant made the defamatory statement with knowledge of its
falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth if the issue involved one of
public interest or concern. 58
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,59 the Supreme Court expressly
rejected the public interest approach. 60 Specifically, the Court held that
the actual malice standard should only be applied to public figure
plaintiffs and that private figure plaintiffs should be entitled to a lower
fault standard. 6 1 Commentators refer to this lower fault standard as lying
somewhere between the New York Times actual malice requirement and
the strict liability approach that defamation actions originally followed.62
In addition, states were granted the authority to set their own fault
53. Id.
54. Id. at 270 (emphasizing the Supreme Court's commitment to the principle that debate on pub-
lic issues should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasant attacks on the government"). Shortly after New York Times, the
Supreme Court extended the actual malice requirement to public figure plaintiffs. See Curtis Publish-
ing Co., v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967). The Court provided a few reasons
for extending the actual malice standard to public figures. Id. at 164-65. These included the similari-
ties between the two groups in developing public policy, as well as the ability of both groups to counter
any criticism against them through the media. Id.
55. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality), overruled by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
56. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 33 (1971).
57. Id. at 43-44 (stating "[i]f a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly
become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the
individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the
event ... not the n.1rtciint'E p -c.-onymity orno.orey")
58. Id. at 52. Mr. Rosenbloom was unable to meet this fault requirement and the radio station's
fight to broadcast the allegations against him was upheld. Id. at 55-57.
59. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
60. Id. at 346-50. Gertz involved an action against a newspaper organization for allegations that
Gertz, a Chicago attorney, was a Communist or part of a Communist conspiracy. Id. at 325-27.
61. Id. at 342-45. The Supreme Court distinguished private figures from public figures and
officials. Id. at 344. Only public plaintiffs would be required to meet the actual malice fault standard
in bringing a defamation action. Id. The Court's conclusion was based on two reasons. First, public
officials and figures have greater access to media channels to contradict any false statements. Id. at
344. And secondly, public figures have placed themselves into the spotlight, and therefore increased
the chances that they would be subject to false and defamatory statements. Id. at 345.
62. See Langvardt, supra note 10, at 926.
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standards for private figure plaintiffs provided they did not implement
liability without fault. 63 Nonetheless, even after Gertz, courts will no
longer presume a defendant's fault in making the defamatory state-
ments. Instead, private and public figure plaintiffs will now be required
to prove some degree of fault on the part of the defendant making the
defamatory statement.
2. Plaintiff Bears Burden of Proof on Issue of Falsity
While the common law presumption of fault was eliminated in New
York Times, it was not until 1986 that the Supreme Court removed
defamation's common law presumption of falsity in Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps. 64 The issue in Hepps was whether a private
party plaintiff or a media defendant bore the burden of proof on the
issue of falsity when a defamation claim involved an issue of public
importance. 65 The Court held that the common law falsity presumption
must give way to the constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the
burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages in
cases involving a media defendant and a statement of public interest. 66
Recognizing that this shifting of the burden of proof to the plaintiff
might protect some false statements, the Court explained that "[t]he First
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect
speech that matters." 67 Consequently, a plaintiff bringing a defamation
action against a media defendant for publishing a matter of public
importance may no longer benefit from a presumption of falsity.68
63. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48 (stating that "[o]ur accommodation to the competing values at stake
in defamation suits by private individuals allows the States to impose liability on the publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood on a less demanding showing than that required by New York
Times"); see also HARPER, supra note 24, § 5.0, at 13-14 (discussing the different liability approaches
available to the states and noting that most courts allow private figure plaintiffs to recover by simply
showing negligence). North Dakota appears to have implemented more of a common law malice
standard in its civil libel statute. See N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-02-03 (1997) (stating that libel is a false
statement which "exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy").
64. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
65. Id. at 776-77. This case involved a defamation action brought by Hepps, the principle
stockholder in a corporation franchising a chain of stores, against a Philadelphia newspaper. Id. at
769. The newspaper published several articles stating Hepps had links to organized crime, which he
used to influence decisions in government. Id.
66. Id. at 776-77.
67. Id. at 778 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341).
68. See Langvardt, supra note 10, at 930 n. 171 (recognizing, however, that the presumption might
still be applicable to claims involving a private figure plaintiff and either a statement of public concern
or a non-media defendant).
NOTE
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3. Presumption of Damages Eliminated
In addition to altering the fault requirement, the Gertz Court also
addressed concerns with the presumption of damages in defamation
cases. 69 Of particular concern was the presumption's potential to hinder
free speech. 70 In Gertz, the Court concluded that recovery for either
presumed or punitive damages would be limited to instances where the
plaintiff proved the defendant had made the defamatory statement with
actual malice. 71 If the private party plaintiff failed to meet this minimum
fault requirement, recovery would be limited to compensation for the
actual injury. 72
Several years later, the Supreme Court rejected this approach to
damages in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 73 At
issue was whether the Gertz rule dictating that a private party plaintiff
cannot be awarded presumed and punitive damages without showing
actual malice applied where the statement about the private figure
plaintiff involved a matter of only private concern. 74 The plurality,
along with two concurring justices, retreated from the "status of the
plaintiff' approach in Gertz and concluded that whether the matter was
of public interest would also be one of the factors concerning
damages. 75 Thus, the actual malice requirement is no longer required
for the recovery of presumed or punitive damages where the action
involves a private figure plaintiff and an issue of private concern.
4. Application of Defamation's Constitutional Requirements
to Product Disparagement Cases
New York Times and its progeny have dramatically altered the
elements of common law defamation. Specifically, the presumptions of
fault, falsity, and damages have been eliminated. As a result, a current
69. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-50; see also Semple, supra note 3, at 426-27 (discussing the
Supreme Court's retreat from presumed damages).
70. See Gertz. 418 U.S. at 348-50.
71. Id. at 349 (stating that "[s]tates may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages,
at least when liability is not based on a showing or knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth").
72. Id. at 350 (providing some examples of actual damages including impairment of reputation
and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering).
73. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality).
74. Langvardt, supra note 10, at 929-930 (citation omitted). Dun & Bradstreet involved the lia-
bility of a credit reporting agency for issuing false financial information about the plaintiff company to
several subscribers. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751-52. The jury awarded the plaintiff company
$50,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. Id.
75. Id. at 761-63 (footnote omitted). Following this approach, the Court concluded that the
plaintiff company was entitled to the damage award without having to prove actual malice because the
false report conceming the plaintiffs financial status was not a matter of public interest. Id.
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defamation action looks quite similar to an action for disparagement
today.
The Supreme Court has never explicitly stated whether defama-
tion's constitutional requirements extend to product disparagement
actions. However, in Bose v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,76
the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's application of the actu-
al malice fault standard to a product disparagement case suggesting
that defamation's constitutional limitations generally apply to pro-
duct disparagement actions. 77 In Bose, the Bose Corporation brought a
product disparagement action against the publisher of Consumer Reports
magazine for statements made about the quality of the corporation's
stereo speaker systems. 78 The trial court determined that the similarities
between defamation and disparagement warranted the application of
defamation's constitutional requirements to product disparagement
actions. 79 As a result, the Bose Corporation, as plaintiff, was required to
prove that the defendant publisher made the statements about the plain-
tiff's speaker systems with actual malice. 80 Consumer Union appealed,
however, because Bose did not challenge the trial court's ruling that it
was a public figure triggering the application of the actual malice fault
standard, the issue on appeal was limited to Consumer Union's
liability. 81 Consequently, when the case reached the Supreme Court the
application of the actual malice standard to a product disparagement
case was not at issue. 82 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's application of the actual malice standard to the product
disparagement case. 83
Indeed, since Bose, several lower courts have taken the Supreme
Court's acceptance of the trial court's decision as an extension of
76. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
77. See id. at 513 (stating that "[w]e may accept all of the purely factual findings of the district
court and nevertheless hold as a matter of law that the record does not contain clear and convincing
evidence" that Consumer Reports "prepared the ... article with knowledge that it was false or with
the reckless disregard of the truth"). See also Vincent Brannigan & Bruce Ensor, Did Bose Speak Too
Softly?: Product Critiques and the First Amendment, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 571, 572-76 (1986)
(discussing the Bose case and specifically the extension of defamation's constitutional protections to
actions for product disparagement).
78. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (1981).
79. Id. at 1270-71.
80. Id.
81. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 191 (1982). Consumer Union
appealed both the finding of liability and the assessment of damages. Id. During oral argument, the
Bose Corporation did not dispute the trial court's finding that the corporation was a public figure. Id.
at 194. In addition, Bose conceded that the rule from New York Times was applicable to this case and
accepted the trial court's conclusion that the actual malice standard applies to product disparagement
cases. Id.
82. See Langvardt, supra note 10, at 736-37 (citations omitted).
83. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Bose).
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defamation's constitutional requirements to product disparagement ac-
tions. 84 Thus, defamation's constitutional requirements provide a start-
ing point for an analysis of the constitutionality of North Dakota's
agricultural disparagement law. 85
III. COMMON LAW PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT CLAIM FAILS
TO PROVIDE RECOVERY TO WASHINGTON'S APPLE
PRODUCERS
Before analyzing North Dakota's disparagement statute, however, it
is necessary to examine a Washington state product disparagement case
involving the state's apple producers. In this case, the apple growers'
failure to recover under a product disparagement claim prompted the
agricultural industry to lobby for the enactment of state agricultural
disparagement statutes.
A. APPLE PRODUCERS SUFFER HARDSHIP
On February 26, 1989, the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)
television program, "60 Minutes," broadcast a segment linking Alar, 86 a
chemical sprayed on apples, to cancer.87 The segment was based primar-
ily upon a report published by the National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), an environmental advocacy group, and focused upon health
84. See, e.g., Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 800 F. Supp. 928, 932-33 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (analyzing
the First Amendment's "of and concerning" requirement in a case involving the product
disparagement of apples); Blatty v. New York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1184 (Cal. 1986); cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988) (concluding that the constitutional limitations on defamation law, including
the "of and concerning" requirement are not peculiar to defamation actions, but apply to all claims
whose gravamen is the alleged injurious falsehood of a statement); Unelklo Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d
1049, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that claims for product disparagement were subject to the same
First Amendment requirements which governed actions for defamation where they were based on
statements made by television personality about a product); Quantum Elec. v. Consumers Union of
U.S., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 753, 763 n. 12 (D.R.I. 1995) (stating that the New York Times actual malice
standard applies to both defamation and disparagement actions where the plaintiff is a public figures);
Flotech, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., 627 F. Supp. 358, 370 (D. Mass. 1985) aft'd, 814 F.2d
775, 777 n.1 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying the "of and concerning" requirement in a product
disparagement action involving an oil treatment ingredient); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing
Co., 486 A.2d 344. 345 (1985): off'l, nn other grc--ds, 516 A.2d 220 (N.J. 1986) (recognizing that
Bose extends the actual malice standard to product disparagement cases).
85. See Semple, supra note 3, at 422 (noting that while the Supreme Court in Bose did not state
specifically whether defamation jurisprudence applies to product disparagement, the Court held that
the product disparagement issue raised in the case fit within the breathing space that gives life to the
First Amendment). At least one commentator has reasoned that the constitutionality of agricultural
disparagement statutes should be assessed according to defamation jurisprudence because speech
concerning the safety of agricultural products can be categorized as "speech that matters" and
because any potential errors in that speech may fit within "the breathing space that gives life to the
First Amendment." See id. at 422-23.
86. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 800 F. Supp. 928, 930 (E.D. Wash. 1992) [hereinafter Auvil 1].
Alar is the common name for the chemical daminozide which was used by the apple industry to
improve fruit appearance, increase size, lengthen shelf life, and decrease fruit disorders. Id.
87. See id at 937-41 (providing a full transcript of the broadcast entitled "'A' is for Apple").
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risks associated with the use of Alar and other pesticides in fruit
production. 88 Following the segment, both apple and apple product
sales dropped dramatically, and several public schools even refused to
serve apples in their cafeterias. 89 The industry suffered losses totaling
more than $500 million. 90 Producers were forced into bankruptcy and
many towns dependent upon apple revenues suffered an economic
crisis.9 1 Producers turned to the legal system for help.92
B. AUVIL I: "OF AND CONCERNING" REQUIREMENT FULFILLED
In response to their financial hardship, eleven apple growers
brought a class action on behalf of 4,700 Washington state apple pro-
ducers against the NRDC, CBS and several CBS affiliate stations in
Yakima County Superior Court. 93 CBS moved to have the suit dismissed,
alleging that the broadcast was not "of and concerning" any specific
grower or growers. 94 However, the district court concluded that all
apples, whether treated with Alar or not, were implicated as dangerous in
the broadcast and the growers were allowed to proceed with their claim
for product disparagement under a group libel theory. 95
C. AUVIL II: APPLE GROWERS FAIL TO PROVE FALSITY OF THE
STATEMENTS
Fifteen months later, the district court granted CBS's second motion
for summary judgment, concluding that the growers could not prove the
broadcast statements were false. 96 The court specifically examined three
88. Id. at 930. The segment focused on the Environmental Protection Agency's knowledge that
Alar breaks down into a carcinogen. Id. The report also asserted that children faced a greater risk
from Alar and other chemicals because children consume large amounts of apple products. Id.
89. See Semple, supra note 3, at 409 (citation omitted).
90. Jerry Jackson, Bashing Beef? Be Careful of State Libel Law, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 23,
1997, at A6.
91. Auvil1, 800 F. Supp. at 931.
92. See Bederman, supra note 8, at 141-44 (providing a progression of the Auvil case through the
courts).
93. Auvil 1, 800 F. Supp. at 931. The action was removed on diversity grounds to the Eastern
District of Washington, where summary judgment was entered in favor of the affiliate stations and the
claims against them were dismissed. Id. at 933-37.
94. Id. at 933. The growers conceded that if this were a defamation action, none of the
individual growers would be able to satisfy the "of and concerning" requirement. Id. at 933. Thus,
the growers argued that because the group was implicated and harmed by the CBS broadcast, they as
a unit met the "of and concerning" requirement. Id. at 932-34.
95. Id. at 935-37 (stating that the universal nature of the hazard was discussed in the segment and
therefore the broadcast was clearly about the Alar tainted apples). But see Stahl, supra note 33, at
527-29 (discussing the flaws in the Auvil court's reasoning that the broadcast was "of and concerning"
all apples and growers). The parties were then given 90 days to proceed with discovery on the issues
of falsity and malice. Auvil 1, 800 F. Supp. at 937.
96. See Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 836 F. Supp. 740, 743 (E.D. Wash. 1993) [hereinafter Auvil
I1].
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factual allegations raised in the broadcast including that Alar was the
most potent cancer-causing agent, an imminent hazard, and that it was
most harmful to children. 97 Recognizing that the plaintiff growers
carried the burden as to the falsity of these statements, the court conclud-
ed that the growers had failed to prove that any of these three assertions
were in fact false, and granted summary judgment to CBS.98
D. AUVIL III: ACTION DISMISSED
The growers appealed the district court's summary judgment ruling
that the growers had failed to offer evidence sufficient to present a
genuine issue of fact on the falsity of the CBS broadcast.9 9 Specifically,
the growers argued that summary judgment as to falsity was improper
because the implied message from the broadcast as a whole could be
proven false.lOO On appeal, the court referred to the Restatement defini-
tion of product disparagement to determine whether the lower court
applied the appropriate standard of proof as to falsity. 101 The Restate-
ment provides that a claim for product disparagement will be established
where a defendant "published a knowingly false statement harmful to
the interests of another and intended such publication to harm the
plaintiff's pecuniary interests." 102 Yet, the Restatement also instructs
that the plaintiff must prove the falsity of the disparaging statement. 103
Applying this standard, the appeals court rejected the growers'
argument that they only needed to prove that the broadcast's whole
message contained a false message.' 04 Instead, the court concluded that
the statements themselves were the primary concern, not the whole
message.' 05 Furthermore, the court dismissed the idea of allowing the
jury to decide the issue of falsity, recognizing that this would only lead
to uncertainty for broadcasters.106 This uncertainty would, in turn, lead
to a chilling of speech.107
97. See id. at 742-43. These three issues are derived from the plaintiff growers' assertion that
the message of the broadcast was that "[b]ecause of the use of daminozide, apples pose an imminent
health hazard of causing cancer especially in children." Id. at 742.
98. See id. at 743 (stating that "[elven if CBS' statements are false, they were about an issue that
mattered, cannot be proven as false and therefore must be protected").
99. See Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1567
(1996) [hereinafter Auvil 111].
100. Id. at 822.
101. Id. at 820 (following the approach taken by a Washington state appellate court decision,
Waechter v. Carnation Co., 485 P.2d 1000, 1003-04 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971), because there were no
Washington state cases dealing directly with a product disparagement cause of action).
102. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 623A).
103. Id. at 820 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, §§ 623A, 651(1)(c)).
104. Id. at 822.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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The Auvil trilogy illustrates the difficulty and inability of Washing-
ton's apple producers to recover damages under a tort claim for com-
mon law product disparagement. Following the growers' failure to
recover damages, the agriculture industry became interested in designing
legislation that would allow for recovery in similar situations. 108 The
dismissal of the apple growers' suit provided the industry and its lobby-
ists with the fuel it needed to press for state product disparagement
statutes. 109
IV. STATE AGRICULTURAL DISPARAGEMENT STATUTES
Although one might have expected Washington to be the first state
to adopt product disparagement legislation, 110 it was Louisiana that first
enacted a statute prohibiting the disparagement of agricultural products
in 1991.111 Since that time, twenty-nine states have considered similar
legislation."l 2 While the statutes share the purpose of protecting the
agricultural or aquacultural economies of the state, 113 the statutes contain
some different provisions concerning the class of plaintiffs, scope of the
action, and damage provisions.114
Many of the statutes limit recovery to strictly plaintiff producers by
defining "producer" as the individual growing or producing the food
product."I5  However, a few other provisions extend the class of plaintiffs
to include not only those who grow the product but also those who
108. See Marianne Lavelle, Food Abuse: Basis for Suits 13 States Say You Can Libel a Fruit;
Oprah Sued for Knocking Hamburger, NAT'L L. J., at AI (1997).
109. See Semple, supra note 3, at 411 (stating that the dismissal of the growers suit ignited the
argument for lobbyists pushing for agricultural disparagement laws). See also Bederman, supra note
8, at 144 (stating that after the apple growers failed to recover, agribusiness became interested in
creating a new cause of action that would allow for recovery where common law disparagement had
failed).
110. While Washington considered agricultural disparagement legislation during the 1995 legis-
lative assembly, the measure was not enacted. See H.B. 1098, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995).
111. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:4501 to 4504 (West Supp. 1998).
112. See supra note 5 (listing the 13 states that have already enacted agricultural product dispar-
agement legislation); see also S.B. 492, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995); S.B. 311, Leg. Sess. (Del. 1991); S.B.
234, 89th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11. 1995); H.B. 106, 76th Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1995);
S.B. 445, Leg. Sess. (Md. 1996); H.B. 5808, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1995); H.R. 2804 78th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1994); H.R. 1720 87th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1994); L.B. 367, 94th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Neb. 1995); H.R. 5159, 205th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.J. 1992); H.B. 949, 179th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Pa. 1995); S.B. 160, Statewide Sess. (Pa. 1995); S.B. 160 Statewide Sess. (S.C. 1995); H.R. 4706
Statewide Sess. (S.C. 1994); H.B. 735, Adjourned Reg. Sess. (Vt. 1996); H.B. 1098, 54th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 1995); A.B. 702, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1995); H.R. 308, 53d Leg., Gen. Sess.
(Wyo. 1995).
113. See Bederman, supra note 8, at 145.
114. See id. at 144-50 (providing a discussion of various state disparagement statutes).
115. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10A-2 (Michie 1995) (stating that a cause of action exists
for damage resulting from the disparagement of any perishable agricultural food product to any
producer of the perishable food product).
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market or sell the product, 116 produce or ship the product, 117 and even
consumers of the product."i8
The scope of the action also differs among the various product
disparagement statutes. While all of the statutes protect agricultural
products, some of the statutes extend protection to aquacultural products
as well."l 9 In addition, South Dakota's statute provides an action for the
disparagement of agriculture products and agricultural practices.120
While all the disparagement statutes provide for compensatory
damages, just one limits the state from collecting punitive damages.121
Additionally, two of the statutes specifically provide for the recovery of
punitive damages if the statement is made with intent to hurt the agricul-
tural producer. 122 Lastly, attorney's fees and court costs are available
under a few of the provisions.123
V. NORTH DAKOTA'S AGRICULTURAL DISPARAGEMENT LAW
Following the lead of twelve states, 124 the North Dakota legislature
enacted the Agricultural Product Defamation Act during the 1997
116. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-622 (Supp. 1997) (defining producer broadly to include "any person
who produces, markets or sells a perishable food product" ).
117. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113 (A) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that "[a] producer,
shipper, or association that represents producers or shippers" may bring an action for false claims
against perishable agricultural food products).
118. See GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-2(3) (Harrison 1994) (stating that a product disparagement
action is available to anyone in the "entire chain from grower to consumer").
119. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113(E)(2) (West Supp. 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
4502(2) (West Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 865.065(2)(b) (West 1994).
120. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-1OA-l(3) (Michie 1995).
121. See IDAHO CODE § 6-2003(3) (Supp. 1997) (stating that only actual pecuniary damages can
be recovered).
122. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10A-2 (Michie 1995) (allowing the court to provide any
other appropriate relief); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81(E) (providing for punitive damages in the
amount of three times the compensatory damages).
123. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113(C) (providing for attorney's fees and court costs to the
successful party); see also OHIO R EV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81 (C) (Anderson Supp. 1996) (providing that
attorney's fees and court costs are appropriate when the plaintiff establishes that the defendant knew
or should have known that the information was false).
124. See supra note 5 (listing the states that have implemented agricultural disparagement
statutes).
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legislative session. 125 Commentators have referred to these product
disparagement statutes as being "tailor-made causes of action." 126 A
look at North Dakota's law, along with its unique legislative history,
reveals that it is no exception.'127
The North Dakota disparagement statute provides for an action
against anyone who "willfully or purposefully disseminates a false and
defamatory statement, knowing the statement to be false," about an
agricultural product or management practice.128 If a court or jury
determines that the defendant acted with malice in making the statement,
the plaintiff is entitled to treble damages.1 29 A unique feature of North
Dakota's law permits an association to bring an action on behalf of an
agricultural producer or class of agricultural producers if the disparag-
ing statement refers to an entire group or class of agricultural producers
or products.1 30 However, in this situation, only actual damages or
injunctive relief can be recovered.131 Finally, the action contains a two
125. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-44-01 to -04 (Supp. 1997). Section 32-44-02 reads as follows:
A person who willfully or purposefully disseminates a false and defamatory
statement, knowing the statement to be false, regarding an agricultural producer or an
agricultural product under circumstances in which the statement may be reasonably
expected to be believed and the agricultural producer is damaged as a result, is liable to
the agricultural producer for damages and other relief allowed by law in a court of
competent jurisdiction, including injunctive relief and compensatory and exemplary
damages. If it is found by a court or jury that a person has maliciously disseminated a
false and defamatory statement regarding an agricultural product or agricultural
producer, the agricultural producer may recover up to three times the actual damages
proven and the court must order that the agricultural producer recover costs,
disbursements, and actual reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in the action.
Section 32-44-03 states:
In addition to the provisions of section 32-44-01, if a false and defamatory
statement is disseminated referring to an entire group or class of agricultural producers
or products, a cause of action arises in favor of each producer, regardless of the size of
the group or class. Each cause of action by a producer or an association representing an
agricultural producer in such case is limited to the actual damages of the producer,
injunctive relief, and exemplary damages.
This legislation was introduced as House Bill 1167 by Representative Eugene Nicholas, Chairman of
the House Agriculture Committee. Similar legislation was introduced during the 1995 Session, but
passage of the bill failed.
126. See Bederman, supra note 8, at 136 (describing the idea of a tailor-made tort for agriculture
disparagement as disturbing, particularly conflicting with the notions of free speech). Bederman states
that "[it is no surprise that agribusiness concerns would try to craft a tailor-made tort of agricultural
disparagement." Id. at 167.
127. See generally Julie J. Srochi, Must Peaches be Preserved at All Costs? Questioning the
Constitutional Validity of Georgia's Perishable Product Disparagement Law, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1223, 1240-44 (providing an an in-depth analysis of Georgia's agricultural disparagement statute and
an evaluation of its constitutionality).
128. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-02 (Supp. 1997).
129. Id.
130. See id. § 32-44-03.
131. Id.
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year statute of limitations period which begins tolling on the date the
false and defamatory statement is communicated.1 32
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
As mentioned, there is some unique history behind North Dakota's
disparagement statute. During the legislative session, this bill received a
substantial amount of attention and press coverage.1 33  Although one
might have expected the lobbying efforts for the bill to have come from
the cattle or grain industry, the driving force behind the enactment of the
law was the North Dakota Equine Ranching Association. 134 The North
Dakota Equine Ranching Association consists of twenty-nine family
ranches1 35 which collect pregnant mares' urine (PMU) to be used in the
production of the pharmaceutical, Premarin.136
During the legislative hearings, North Dakota equine ranchers told
of their experiences with animal rights groups and national media
programs publishing stories which claimed the ranchers were mistreating
and abusing their horses in the practice of collecting the urine.137 The
medical industry and women also testified in support of the bill, empha-
sizing the importance of PMU in the production of Premarin and its
medical benefits. 138 While several other groups expressed their support
132. See id. § 32-44-04.
133. See, e.g., Tony Bender, Reasons for not Horsing With Free Speech, BISMARCK TRIm., Feb. 17,
1997, at 4A; Doan, supra note 1, at 4D; Frederick Kirschenmann, Farmers Should Oppose Ag Slander
Bill, FARGO FORUM, Feb. 21, 1997. The issue also received press prior to the 1997 legislative session.
See, e.g., Jack Zaleski, Misanthropic PETA is at it Again, FARCO FORUM, Apr. 1996; PETA 's Charges
are Flimsy, FARGO FORUM, Mar. 3, 1995.
134. The equine ranching industry is more than 50 years old and involves the care and handling
of horses for the collection of pregnant mares' urine (PMU). Hearing, supra note 6 (information
presented by Cal Rolfson, representing the North Dakota Equine Ranching Association). The urine is
collected in a suspension device and then sold to companies for use in the production of
pharmaceuticals. Id. A typical rancher cares for about 157 horses. Id.
135. These ranches are located in 11 north central North Dakota counties including: Montrail,
Ward, Bottineau, McHenry, Pierce, Rolette, Benson, Towner, Cavalier, Ramsey, and Foster. Hearing,
supra note 6 (information provided by the North Dakota Equine Ranching Association). These ranches
are the only operations in the United States collecting (PMU) for pharmaceutical production. Id.
136. Premarin is an estrogen replacement therapy and is used to help relieve symptoms of meno-
pause and treat steoprnoi. See N-ing !996 Drug Handbook 721 (David Moreau et ai. eds.
Springhouse Corp. 1996).
137. See Hearing, supra note 6 (testimony of Kevin Frith, Donald Bryant, and Vernon Gustafson,
North Dakota equine ranchers). The allegations of mistreatment and abuse were later dismissed by
the North Dakota Board of Animal Health, the United States Department of Agriculture, and the
American Association of Equine Practitioners. Id.
138. See Hearing, supra note 6 (letter to Agriculture Committee from Dr. Thomas P. Hutchens,
M.D.). Dr. Hutchen's letter stated that estrogen replacements made from mare urine have benefits
over replacements made from synthetic estrogen. Id.; see also Hearing, supra note 6 (statements of
Senator Donna Nalewaja, co-sponsor of H.B. 1176). Senator Nalewaja's testimony emphasized the
benefits attributed to Premarin. Id. Specifically, this pharmaceutical benefits eight million women
during menopause. Id.
106 [VOL. 74:89
19981
for the bill,139 no other agricultural producer or group mentioned a
specific incident of product disparagement that the legislation was
intended to cure. 140
B. NORTH DAKOTA'S "TAILOR-MADE" STATUTE
There appear to be several "tailor-made" qualities in North Dako-
ta's law. First, the statute provides a cause of action for agricultural
practices as well as products. 141 This provision expands the group of
potential plaintiffs to include individuals like the equine ranchers, who
do not specifically produce animals or plants. Additionally, North
Dakota's statute defines "agricultural products" to include the products
of a plant or animal and the agricultural practices used in the production
of such products. 142 Without this expanded definition, the equine
ranchers would not be allowed to bring an action against the individuals
alleging they mistreated the horses in the collection of the urine.143
Secondly, associations are permitted to bring a cause of action on
behalf of individual members. 144 This feature also appears to be tailored
to the equine ranchers. Not only do the twenty-nine equine ranches in
North Dakota belong to North Dakota's Equine Ranching Association,
but many belong to the North American Equine Ranching Information
Council (NAERIC).145 As a result, these associations or any of the
various associations representing equine ranchers could bring actions on
the ranchers' behalf should they be unable to bring the action on their
own. This option would not be possible without the inclusion of this
provision in North Dakota's statute. 146
Finally, treble damages can be recovered under North Dakota's
law. 147 The inclusion of this provision is arguably targeted at those
specific groups, the animals rights groups and national media programs,
that have already made false statements about the equine ranchers.148
139. See Hearing, supra note 6 (Senate Standing Committee Report). Among the agriculture
groups testifying in support of H.B. 1176 included: the Agriculture Coalition, the North Dakota Farm
Bureau, the North Dakota Grain Dealers, the North Dakota Farmers Union, and the North Dakota
Stockmen's Association. Id.
140. Id.
141. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-02 (Supp. 1997).
142. See id. § 32-44-01(2).
143. See id.
144. See id. § 32-44-03.
145. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 6 (testimony of North Dakota equine rancher, Kevin Frith)
(describing his involvement in four various horse and equine ranching associations).
146. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-03.
147. See id. § 32-44-02.
148. See Hearing, supra note 6 (testimony of North Dakota equine rancher, Donald Bryant) (de-
tailing the incidents surrounding the targeting of his ranching operation by the Inside Edition television
program).
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These organizations and news programs are quite powerful and merely
limiting recovery to actual damage would arguably not stop them from
publishing falsehoods. In this author's opinion, adding the possibility
of a treble damage award might be enough to deter these large organiza-
tions from continuing their present practices in the state.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE OF NORTH DAKOTA'S LAW
The constitutionality of North Dakota's or any other state's agricul-
tural product disparagement statute has yet to be determined. Currently,
there have been just two reported cases challenging state agricultural
product disparagement laws. In Action for a Clean Environment v.
Georgia,149 the challenge to Georgia's law was dismissed because the
action failed to contain an actual controversy. 150 However, what was
touted as the first test of these laws' constitutionality involved Texas'
false disparagement and perishable food products law. 151 A group of
Texas cattle ranchers initiated a lawsuit against Oprah Winfrey and her
production company, Harpo, for agricultural disparagement in a federal
court in Amarillo, Texas.152 The plaintiff ranchers' action maintained
that Winfrey's remarks about beef caused a decline in cattle prices.153
However, without explanation, the judge ruled that the cattlemen could
not proceed under the Texas agriculture disparagement law.154
Because the Supreme Court appears to have approved the applica-
tion of defamation's constitutional requirements to product disparage-
ment actions in Bose, defamation's constitutional requirements will
provide a starting point for a constitutional evaluation of North Dakota's
agricultural disparagement statute. 155 Applying these requirements to
the statute reveals that the some of the First Amendment's constitutional
requirements may have been overlooked, and the statute is therefore
149. 457 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
150. Action for a Clean Environment v. Georgia, 457 S.E.2d 273, 274 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). This
action challenged Georgia's disparagement statute and was brought by the American Civil Liberties
Union on behalf of two food safety groups fearing possible lawsuits. Id. at 273. The ACLU
challenged the statute seeking to have the statute declared unconstitutional. Id.: see generally, Srochi,
supra note 127, at 1242 (providing an in-depth analysis of this case).
151. See TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 96.001-.004 (West Supp. 1996).
152. See Lavelle, supra note 108, at 3. During a segment of the "Oprah" show, Oprah and her
guests were discussing bovine spongiform encephalopathy, commonly referred to as "mad cow"
disease. Id. While one of her guests was discussing the practice of feeding cattle protein to other
cattle, the practice believed to be responsible for transmitting the disease in England, Winfrey said to
her viewing audience, "It has just stopped me cold from eating another burger!" Id.
153. Jackson, supra note 90, at A6.
154. Sue Anne Pressley, Oprah Winfrey Wins Case Filed by Cattlemen, WASH. POST, Feb. 27,
1998, at A3. As a result of this ruling, the case proceeded under a common law business defamation
challenge. Id.
155. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing the extension of defamation
requirements to cases involving product disparagement).
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arguably unconstitutional. First, the statute fails to require that the
defamatory statement be "of and concerning" a particular plaintiff's
product or practice.1 56 Secondly, the statute improperly places the
burden of proof on the defendant to prove that what was said about the
product or practice was true. 157 Finally, while the statute requires a
showing of actual malice before an individual is entitled to bring a claim
for agricultural disparagement,158 this actual malice standard require-
ment is not extended to the punitive damage portion of the statute.1 59
A. STATUTE CONTAINS No "OF AND CONCERNING" REQUIREMENT
As previously mentioned, the "of and concerning" requirement
was an original common law element of both defamation and
disparagement.160 However, this requirement was clearly identified as a
constitutional element of defamation by the United States Supreme
Court in the Rosenblatt case.161 North Dakota's disparagement statute
could face a constitutional challenge on the grounds that the statute fails
to require the defendant's statement be "of and concerning" the
plaintiff.162
Although the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether
this constitutional requirement extends to disparagement cases, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has heard one case commenting on this particu-
lar issue. 163 In Blatty v. New York Times, Inc., the court stated that the
limitations that define the First Amendment zone of protection are not
peculiar to defamation actions, but apply to all claims whose gravamen is
156. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-03 (Supp. 1997) (allowing any producer to recover for
defamatory statements made about another agricultural producer or product). See infra part VI.A.
(discussing the absence of an "of and concerning" provision in North Dakota's statute).
157. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-44-01 to -04 (failing to identify who bears the burden
of proof as to each of the tort's elements); see also infra part VI.B. (describing how the statute
improperly shifts the burden of proof to the defendant speaker).
158. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-01(6) (defining "knowing the statement to be false" with the
definition associated with actual malice).
159. See id. § 32-44-02 (using the term "maliciously" rather than the Supreme Court's require-
ment of "actual malice").
160. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing the "of and concerning" require-
ment at common law).
161. See supra note 25 (describing the Rosenblatt case).
162. See Bederman, supra note 8, at 160 (discussing the absence of this requirement in most agri-
cultural disparagement statutes). Specifically, Bederman reasons that many state agricultural dispar-
agement statutes are constitutionally deficient because they eliminate the common law "of and
concerning requirement." Id. While Bederman recognizes that courts have applied this requirement
unevenly, he notes that some nexus of injury between the class of plaintiffs and the injurious statement
must be shown. Id. However, since many disparagement statutes lack this requirement, individuals in
the chain from grower to consumer could sue for a general statement made by a journalist or food
safety advocate. Id. (citations omitted).
163. See Blatty v. New York Times, Inc., 728 P.2d 1177, 1182-83 (Cal. 1986), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 934 (1988). Blatty involved an action brought by an author against a newspaper because the
newspaper failed to include the author's work in a best-seller list. Id. at 1179.
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alleged falsehood.16 4 The California court concluded that the First
Amendment requires that the falsehood specifically refer to the plaintiff
in some manner, regardless of whether the claim is for defamation. 165
Thus, a right of action for injurious falsehood should be granted to only
those who are the direct object of criticism, not those who merely
complain of non-specific statements that caused hurt.166 The court
reasoned that both logical and pragmatic concerns compelled that the
"of and concerning" requirement extend to all claims, regardless of
their label.167
While some cases have interpreted the "of and concerning" require-
ment to mean that the false statements must refer to the plaintiff person-
ally,16 8 other courts only require that there be some type of nexus
between the class of plaintiffs and the false statement. 169 Under either
definition, the "of and concerning" requirement helps ensure that only
those individuals "who are the direct object of criticism" can bring a
disparagement action.170
A second reason for extending defamation's constitutional "of and
concerning" requirement to disparagement actions is rooted in two
Supreme Court cases. First, the Supreme Court in Rosenblatt, concluded
that the "of and concerning" element is a constitutional requirement of
defamation; and then in Bose, the Court affirmed a lower court's applica-
tion of defamation's constitutional actual malice fault requirement to a
product disparagement case. Read together, these cases support an exten-
sion of defamation's "of and concerning" constitutional requirement to
product disparagement actions. 171
164. Id. at 1182.
165. See id. at 1183.
166. Id. (recognizing that allowing a plaintiff who is not identified to bring an action poses an
"unjustifiable threat to society").
167. Id. at 1184. If constitutional requirements were only applicable to actions classified as
"defamation," free speech and free press would not be protected because a plaintiff could improperly
title their claim as one for disparagement to avoid the constitutional requirements. Id.
168. See Sims v. Kiro, Inc., 580 P.2d 642, 646 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that the plaintiff
failed to show he was referred to in a telecast because the telecast did not identify or picture the
plaintiff and the statements made by the defendant were of a genera! nature).
169. Bederman, supra note 8, at 160 (citing Golden North Airways, Inc. v. Tanana Publ'g. Co.,
218 F.2d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 1954) (stating that plaintiffs in a large group are more likely to recover
under a claim for disparagement than defamation because it is more difficult to show that defamatory
statements refer to "a particular member of the group").
170. Id. at 160 (citing Blatty, 728 P.2d at 1183).
171. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the lower court's extension of
defamation's constitutional requirements to actions for product disparagement by several lower
courts).
110 [VOL. 74:89
1998]
However, North Dakota's provision fails to explicitly state that the
false statement must refer to the plaintiff.172 Instead, the law provides
that any producer can recover damages for a statement "regarding an
agricultural producer or an agricultural product."173 The statute further
defines "producer" as "any person engaged in growing, raising, distri-
buting, or selling an agricultural product, or manufacturing the product
for consumer use," 174 making the potential class of plaintiffs extremely
broad. This expansive definition arguably allows a plaintiff to recover
when the defamatory statements concern products that the producer only
has an economic interest in, rather than requiring the defamatory
statements be directed at the plaintiff's particular products.175
In summary, not only has California's Supreme Court concluded
that the "of and concerning" requirement is a constitutional require-
ment of disparagement, but the Bose case is being relied upon by lower
court's as an extension of defamation's constitutional requirements to
product disparagement. North Dakota's statute fails to require that the
defamatory statements specifically reference the plaintiff's agricultural
products or practices and thus, the statute is open to possible challenge.
B. BURDEN OF PROOF SHOULD BE CLEARLY PLACED ON THE PLAINTIFF
In the Hepps case, the Supreme Court reasoned that in all defama-
tion actions the burden of proof as to the falsity of the defendant's
statement must be placed on the individual bringing the action.176 As a
result, North Dakota's statute could face a constitutional challenge for
failing to meet this requirement. Instead of placing the burden squarely
upon the plaintiff, North Dakota's disparagement statute appears to
eliminate the plaintiff's obligation to prove falsity by improperly
placing the burden of proof on the defendant speaker to show that the
172. One commentator has referred to the absence of this requirement as a direct response to the
Alar dispute where under the common law non-growers, including apple juice and apple sauce
producers, were unable to bring a claim because they failed to meet the "of and concerning"
requirement. See Semple, supra note 3, at 430.
173. N.D. CENr. CODE § 32-44-02 (Supp. 1997). The scope of who may bring a claim under the
disparagement laws differs. While most define a "producer" as a person who grows or produces the
perishable product, some states have implemented a broader definition. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§
6-5-620 (Supp. 1997) (extending a cause of action to anyone who sells or markets the agricultural
products); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-16-1 to -4 (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1997) (providing a claim to any
individual in the "entire chain from grower to consumer"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113 (West Supp.
1997) (allowing shippers to also bring forth an action).
174. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-01(1).
175. For example, under North Dakota's disparagement statute, beet grower A could bring an
action for disparagement even if the defamatory statement was directed at grower B's beets if the
statement caused injury to grower A. Therefore, even though the statements were not "of and
concerning" A's beets, under the statute, A could bring forth an action.
176. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Hepps case).
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defamatory statement was truthful. 177 Not only is the statute silent with
respect to who carries the burden on this element, 178 but the statute
incorporates a very broad definition for "false statement." 179
The statute defines "false statement" as a statement not based upon
"reasonable and reliable scientific inquiry, data, or facts."1 80 If the
plaintiff shows that the statement is not based upon "reasonable" and
"reliable" scientific evidence, it is presumed to be false.181 Therefore,
the plaintiff is only required to show that the statement was not based
upon "reasonable" and "reliable" scientific evidence, rather than
showing that the statement was false. Furthermore, the nature of scientif-
ic inquiry makes the issue of falsity difficult to prove because often there
are legitimate differences in scientific opinion that exist until hypotheses
are tested and refined. 182 The situation becomes a battle of scientific
evidence and the defendant will likely be required to prove the truth of
the statements by offering and convincing a fact finder of the "reliabili-
ty" of the scientific basis relied upon in making the assertions. 183
However, placing the burden of proof as to falsity of the statement on
the defendant has been declared a direct constitutional violation of the
speaker's First Amendment right to free speech.184 Therefore, North
Dakota's statute could face a constitutional challenge on this basis.
C. PUNITIVE DAMAGES NOT PERMITTED WITHOUT SHOWING OF
ACTUAL MALICE
Finally, a constitutional challenge could also be made concerning
the punitive damage portion of the North Dakota statute. 185  As men-
tioned, the Supreme Court, in Gertz, concluded that presumed or punitive
damages would only be awarded in defamation actions where the plain-
tiff proved the defendant made the false statement with actual malice. 186
177. See Semple, supra note 3, at 429-31 (discussing the absence of this requirement in many of
the veggie libel laws).
178. But see IDAHO CODE § 6-2003(2) (Supp. 1997) (stating that "the plaintiff shall bear the bur-
den of proof and persuasion as to each element of the cause of action and must prove each element by
clear and convincing evidence").
180. Id.
181. See Semple, supra note 3, at 439 (citation omitted).
182. See Lavelle, supra note 108, at 2 (explaining that one critic has stated that under this
expanded definition, it would have been illegal to criticize pesticides, such as DDT, which were
thought to be safe according to data considered to be "reasonable" and "reliable" at that time).
183. See Semple, supra note 3, at 440-41.
184. See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776-77.
185. Because North Dakota's statute appears to meet the actual malice fault standard with
respect to a plaintiff bringing a claim for product disparagement, this section of the note is exclusively
analyzing the punitive damage portion of the statute contained in N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-02.
186. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Gertz case's analysis of
damages).
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Section 32-44-02 of the North Dakota Century Code explicitly provides
for an award of treble damages if a person "maliciously" disseminates
a false and defamatory statement. 187 Instead of referring to the "actual
malice" standard, the statute uses the term "malicious" which has been
found by some courts to be less onerous than the "actual malice"
standard.188 As a result, the statute arguably conflicts with the constitu-
tional requirement that punitive damages may only be permitted where
the plaintiff proves that a media defendant acted with New York Times
"actual malice." 189
While one might argue that "malicious" means actual malice, this
argument has been explored and rejected by at least one commen-
tator.190 To pass constitutional muster, North Dakota should have specifi-
cally used the terms "actual malice" in the treble damages section of its
statute to avoid any confusion over what fault standard was required. A
court could interpret the use of the term "malicious" as a reference to
the common law requirement and only require the plaintiff to show that
the statement was deliberately calculated to injure, 191 which falls below
the level of fault the Supreme Court requires for allowing punitive
damages.
VII. AN ALTERNATIVE TO NORTH DAKOTA'S CURRENT
STATUTE
Evaluating the constitutionality of North Dakota's statute is purely
an academic exercise. However, the injury suffered by North Dakota's
PMU ranchers and other agricultural producers in the country is a
legitimate concern impacting not only them, but their respective state
economies. Therefore, it is important to examine and evaluate some
alternatives to North Dakota's present statute. This will not only provide
some options for those states currently considering agricultural product
disparagement legislation, but will also afford North Dakota's legislature
with some alternatives.
A. PRESERVING CONSTITUTIONALITY THROUGH AMENDMENT
One possible solution to the constitutional defects in North Dako-
ta's statute is amending the current statute to incorporate the missing
187. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-02 (Supp. 1997).
188. See Srochi, supra note 127, at 1243-44 (citing Straw v. Chase Revel, Inc., 813 F.2d 356, 363
n.7) (finding that "malicious" means common law malice, not actual malice).
189. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
190. See Bederman, supra note 8. at 154 n.150 (stating that just because the statute refers to
"malicious dissemination" does not necessarily mean that the statute is recognizing the standard
enunciated in New York Times).
191. See id.
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constitutional requirements. While North Dakota and several other states
have failed to meet these requirements, Idaho has made an attempt to
implement the constitutional requirements. 192 Idaho's statute could
serve as a model for North Dakota, and other states, to ensure their
respective statutes meet constitutional minimums.193
First, Idaho's provision contains two separate phrases ensuring that
the "of and concerning" requirement is met. 194 The statute requires the
false factual statement be "of and concerning the plaintiff's specific
perishable agricultural food product"195 and also be "clearly directed at
a particular plaintiff's product."1 96 Because of these references, there is
no confusion over who is entitled to bring a product disparagement
claim and generic products are excluded from recovery.197
Secondly, Idaho's law clears up any potential confusion over who
bears the burden of proof on each of the tort's elements. The statute
specifically states that "[t]he plaintiff shall bear the burden of proof and
persuasion as to each element of the cause of action and must prove each
element by clear and convincing evidence."1 98 Additionally, Idaho's
192. IDAHO CODE § 6-2003 reads as follows:
(1) A producer of perishable agricultural food products who suffers actual damages as
a result of another person's disparagement of the producer's product may bring an
action for actual damages in a court of competent jurisdiction.
(2) The plaintiff shall bear the burden of proof and persuasion as to each element of the
cause of action and must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence.
(3) The plaintiff may only recover actual pecuniary damages. Neither presumed nor
punitive damages shall be allowed.
(4) The disparaging factual statement must be clearly directed at a particular plaintiffs
product. A factual statement regarding a generic group of products, as opposed to a
specific producer's product, shall not serve as the basis for a cause of action.
(5) Notwithstanding any limitation continued in chapter 2, title 5, Idaho Code, an action
under the provisions of this chapter must be commenced within two (2) years after
the cause of action accrues and not thereafter.
(6) This statutory cause of action is not intended to abrogate the common law action for
product disparagement or any other cause of action otherwise available.
IDAHO CODE § 6-2003 (Supp. 1997).
193. One might question why only Idaho has implemented what appears to be constitutional
legislation. Prior to the Idaho state legislature enacting product disparagement legislation, the Idaho
Attorney General's office was asked to provide a constitutional analysis of a draft bill. See Beder-
man, supra note 8, at 149 (referring to the Letter from Idaho Attorney General's Office to Senator
Herb Carison, idaho State Senator, concerning House Biii 593 (Feb. 28, i992)); see aiso Hearing,
supra note 6 (a copy of this letter can be found in the House and Senate Committee materials on H.B.
1176). The Attorney General's office conveyed constitutional concerns with the draft legislation. See
id. Consequently, Idaho passed legislation that met these concerns. See id.
194. IDAHO CODE § 6-2002(l)(a).
195. Id. § 6-2002(l)(a).
196. Id. § 6-2003(4).
197. See Bederman, supra note 8, at 148-49 (stating that this requirement excludes a cause of
action for generic products in Idaho).
198. IDAHO CODE § 6-2003(2). But see N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-44-01 to -04 (Supp. 1997)
(offering no direction on the issue of who bears the burden of proof as to the tort's elements).
[VOL. 74:89
1998]
law does not attempt to define "false statement." 199 North Dakota's
definition of false statement only adds confusion to who bears the
burden as to falsity of the false statement, and arguably opens the door
to constitutional challenge. 200 On account of these two differences,
Idaho's statute places the burden of proof squarely on the plaintiff's
shoulders.
And finally, Idaho's statute prohibits an award of either presumed
or punitive damages. 20 1 Specifically, it limits recovery to only the
amount of the "actual pecuniary damages." 202 North Dakota could
benefit from following this approach and eliminating its treble damage
provision. This would clear up the confusion and constitutional prob-
lems the statute faces in awarding treble damages without requiring the
plaintiff to prove actual malice. 203
B. THE ENACTMENT OF A PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT STATUTE WAS
NOT NECESSARY FOR THE RANCHERS OR OTHER AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCERS TO RECOVER
North Dakota's statute can be amended to rid the law of its constitu-
tional defects, but the need for such a law at all poses an interesting
question. In analyzing the circumstances surrounding North Dakota's
agricultural disparagement statute, it appears that the North Dakota
legislature could have resisted the push by lobbyists to implement this
law. Even without the statute, the equine ranchers and other producers
could still bring actions under existing state defamation law.
It seems that an important principle of defamation law was over-
looked regarding the equine ranchers' situation. Although the ranchers
were lobbying for product disparagement protection, one could argue
that it was really damage to their reputation that was suffered. Often
defamation and disparagement are mistaken for one another and
distinguishing between injury to reputation and injury to economic
interests becomes difficult, especially when the falsehood concerns the
199. IDAHO CODE § 6-2002 (providing no definition of false statement). But see N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-44-01(5) (providing that a false statement is one not based upon "reasonable and reliable
scientific inquiry, facts, or data").
200. See supra note 173-81 and accompanying text explaining the burden problems associated
with using such a broad definition of false statement.
201. IDAHO CODE § 6-2003(3).
202. Id.
203. Alternatively, the treble damage provision could be preserved and the constitutional prob-
lem cured by removing the reference to "malicious" and inserting the terms "actual malice" into the
statute. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-02.
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plaintiff's business or products. 204 Determining what claim to proceed
under is not only difficult, but significant because it may place the
plaintiff in a more favorable position to recover damages.205
The legislative history behind the implementation of North Dako-
ta's statute revolved around the plight of the state's PMU ranchers.206
Although other agricultural organizations supported the measure, it was
the concerns expressed by the PMU industry that appeared to be the
primary force behind the legislation. 207 Moreover, there were no other
incidents of product disparagement that the supporters stated the bill was
intended to address. 208 Thus, one might ask whether the equine ranchers
would be able to recover for the falsehoods directed at them had the
legislature not enacted the measure.
In states where agricultural disparagement statutes have not been
enacted, producers are not left without recourse. Often times, an agricul-
tural producer can still proceed under state defamation laws. Similarly,
North Dakota's equine ranchers could have brought an action under the
state's defamation laws. 209  Furthermore, the facts surrounding the
equine ranchers injury from the falsehood indicates that they would have
successfully recovered under these statutes.
The animal rights groups and national media programs were not
communicating falsehoods about the equine ranchers' product, but were
instead publishing falsehoods concerning the ranchers mistreatment and
abuse of their horses. Thus, their situation clearly had "reputational . . .
notions lurk[ing] in the background." 210  The falsehoods clearly went
beyond injuring ranchers economic interest in their product, because the
falsehoods injured reputation. Thus, the ranchers claim arguably rested
in defamation, rather than product disparagement.
204. See Langvardt, supra note 10, at 920 (stating that allowing corporations and not just natural
persons to bring defamation suits, as well as product disparagement suits, has led to the blurring of the
two torts because often a false statement which adversely affects economic interests also damages the
reputation of the corporate plaintiff).
205. Id. at 920-21 n. 118 (recognizing that in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Jacobson, 827
F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), plaintiff's ability to characterize the case as one for defamation was
extremely beneficial because the plaintiff could not meet injurious falsehood's damage requirement of
howing econoi-ic iuss stemming from the false aliegation, however under a claim for defamation
plaintiff recovered $1,000,000 in presumed damages).
206. See supra Part V.A. (discussing the legislative history of North Dakota's disparagement
statute).
207. Id.
208. See supra note 139-40 and accompanying text (noting that the hearings on H.B. 1176 re-
vealed no other specific incidents of agricultural disparagement that the legislation was intended to
cure).
209. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-03 (1997) (providing a cause of action for civil libel); §
14-02-04 (1997) (providing a cause of action for civil slander).
210. See Langvardt, supra note 10, at 922 (using this phrase to describe the intermingling of the
two torts).
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Furthermore, North Dakota's civil and libel statutes, do not limit
recovery to reputational injury, but allow actions for individuals who suf-
fer injury to their occupation, trade, and profession. 2 1l As a result, agri-
cultural producers who suffer injury to reputation or business from false
statements about their occupation or profession could bring an action
under either of these statutes. 2 12 For example, under North Dakota's
civil libel statute, libel is defined as a false and unprivileged communi-
cation which causes an individual "to be shunned or avoided, or which
has a tendency to injure the person in the person's occupation."2 13
Similarly, North Dakota's civil slander statute provides an action for libel
where the publication tends to injure one regarding profession, trade, or
business, either by imputing disqualifications which the occupation
requires or imputing something to lessen the business' profits.214 These
statutes provide for recovery to those individuals who suffer economic
injury to their profession or occupation, rather than limiting recovery to
incidents of personal injury. As a result, producers have a remedy when
false statements are published about their products or practices. Thus,
the necessity of North Dakota's disparagement statute is questionable.
VIII. CONCLUSION
North Dakota's agriculture disparagement statute was prematurely
enacted to meet the laudable concerns of the state's equine ranching
industry. However, the assertions made against the ranchers appear to be
rooted in defamation, rather than product disparagement. In addition,
North Dakota's civil libel and slander statutes are quite broad extending
recovery to injury or economic loss suffered in an individual's occupa-
tion or profession. Therefore, existing state libel and slander laws would
have adequately provided recovery to the state's agricultural producers.
But more importantly, North Dakota's statute, like those passed in
twelve other states, may likely face constitutional challenge. While North
Dakota's statute appears to have implemented some constitutional
requirements, the law could be declared unconstitutional for failing to
meet the "of and concerning" requirement, improperly placing the
burden as to falsity on the defendant speaker, and awarding punitive
damages without the necessary fault requirement. Until amended, the
statute arguably continues to inhibit free speech.
Jennifer J. Mattson
211. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02-03; 14-02-04.
212. Id.
213. See id. § 14-02-03 (emphasis added).
214. See id. § 14-02-04 (emphasis added).
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